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Thomas Suddendorf 
ow did the human mind evolve? Why do we appear to be so different from other animals? 
These rather profound questions have attracted plenty of speculation in philosophy, 
anthropology and psychology. Yet, many remain appropriately sceptical about the proposals that 
have been put forward. How could one possibly go beyond just-so stories and make proper 
scientific progress in this domain? Although there is an ever growing archeological record of our 
ancestors, minds unfortunately do not fossilise. Many reconstructions, such as those showcased 
in popular TV documentaries, seem little more than plausible conjecture at best. In recent years, 
researchers have increasingly looked to extant primates for clues as to how to breathe life into 
the fossilised remains of our forebears. But there has been little explicit discussion in psychology 
of how the study of primates can inform us about the evolution of the human mind. Here I will 
present ways through which real progress may be made. 
Humans are primates (see Figure 1). Like other primates, and unlike most other mammals, we 
rely more on vision than smell and our brains are large relative to our body size. There are clear 
continuities between the anatomy and physiology of humans and our closest living relatives. Yet, 
humans are the only primates to have colonised most habitats on this planet, built a diversity of 
civilisations, gained immense power to create and destroy, and invented elaborate ideas about 
divine beings that care about humans. These differences may reflect our special minds. Indeed, 
to many people, human minds appear so vastly superior to anything that can be found in the 
animal kingdom that it is difficult to reconcile this apparent gap with Darwin’s (1859) notion of 
descent with modification. Curiously, however, there is no established inventory of uniquely 
human mental traits. The first way in which the study of primates can help us, then, is in 
establishing what in fact the differences are that appear to set us apart from other primates.   
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Phylogenetic tree of the hominoidea. Based on latest genetic analysis, the lines that led to humans and to 
chimpanzees split 5.1 million years ago, the line that led to gorillas split 6.3 million years ago and 
orangutans diverged 13.8 million years ago. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, split off from the line 
that led to modern apes some 25.3 million years ago. Other data suggest that gibbons split off some 18 
million years ago.1 
 
Route 1: Fact finding 
It may be instructive to consider for yourself what you think are uniquely human mental traits. 
When I ask my students the most common answers involve language, reason, complex emotion, 
foresight, conscience, self-awareness, and creativity. But these answers are not straightforward. 
H
Consider the most popular answer: language. Clearly non-human animals communicate.2 So we 
need to specify what it is about the human communication system that may set it apart from other 
such systems. Whereas animal communications are typically restricted to specific signals in 
settings such as mating, predation and territoriality, human language is open-ended and not 
restricted to a domain. It involves the application of rules that allow us to combine a finite set of 
arbitrary symbols into a virtually limitless set of expressions.3 Although researchers have tried to 
teach great apes such communication systems (eg, sign language), there is as yet no reason to 
expect that a chimpanzee will one day address the Academy (as in Franz Kafka’s famous story). 
Apes can learn hundreds of symbols, but application of rules that allow us to combine and 
recombine symbols into novel, open-ended sentences appears to be uniquely human.4  
Similar qualifications have to be made for the other purportedly unique human attributes. For 
example, apes can solve problems in their minds.5 They show evidence of means-ends 
reasoning. Thus, what aspect of human reasoning is unique, and hence needs explanation, has 
to be determined from careful examination of comparative data. If we want to investigate how the 
human mind evolved, we need to first identify more precisely what aspects of our mind are in fact 
unique and what is shared with our closest relatives.  
The study of primate cognition has certainly revealed some extraordinary findings of mental 
sophistication.6 And some previously cherished notions of human uniqueness have already been 
eliminated through such work.7 For example, the ability to use tools, to manufacture tools, to 
cooperate to kill conspecifics (ie, members of one’s own species), or to have sex for reasons 
other than procreation, can no longer be upheld as distinguishing characteristics of Homo 
sapiens. Even the notion that we are the only species to retain group specific traditions (arguably, 
culture) had to be abandoned as chimpanzees and orangutans have been shown to have such 
socially maintained traditions.8  
Andrew Whiten and I reviewed the evidence in great apes for various cognitive abilities typical of 
a human toddler of 18 to 24 months.9 There is evidence for pretense, means-ends reasoning, 
understanding invisible displacement, interpreting depictions, attribution of intentions and 
emotions to others and self-recognition in mirrors. These abilities are hence not uniquely human. 
According to the Perner (1991) theory of cognitive development, these abilities all involve a 
capacity to entertain secondary representations.10 That is, the child or ape has to hold in mind 
more than one model or representation of the world. For example, in pretense, they have to 
represent the pretend (eg, a pie) and the real world (eg, mud), and not confuse one for the other 
(ie, not eating one’s mud pies). Apes and two-year-old children seem to share this mental power.  
Only by around age three and a half do human children reach Perner’s next level of 
representational skill: to form meta-representations; that is they then can represent 
representational relations. Meta-representation may be involved on some level or other in many 
of the characteristics often purported to distinguish human from animal minds. For example, it is 
required to understand how other people may (mis-) represent the world, to invent symbols, and 
to reflect on past and future events.11 There is as yet no convincing evidence that apes, or any 
other animals, form meta-representations,12 and this might therefore constitute a fundamental 
cognitive ability that sets humans apart. Further systematic comparative work needs to be done 
to establish a proper inventory of what is uniquely human and what is shared with our closest 
living relatives. 
Route 2: Phylogenetic reconstruction 
Let us assume, for the moment, that we are right in attributing secondary representations to the 
other great apes. How can this help us reconstruct the evolution of our mind? From an 
evolutionary perspective, traits can be shared for two very different reasons. One is analogy (or 
homoplasy) and the other is homology. In the first case, species share the same trait or 
characteristic because they solve the same problem. For example, wings in birds and wings in 
insects both solve the problem of flight. However, the morphology is very different. They are the 
result of different but convergent adaptations – independent evolutionary events. In the case of 
homology, a feature is shared between species because of common descent. The common 
ancestor had the characteristic and passed it down to the descended species that currently share 
the trait. We share the hand characteristic of an opposable thumb with other primates, because 
our common ancestor had it already and we inherited it. If we are right and all great apes have 
the ability to form secondary representations, then we can ask whether that is because of 
homology or analogy.  
To decide between the two options, researchers use phylogenetic reconstruction.13 The best, or 
most parsimonious, phylogenetic hypothesis is the one that requires the fewest changes. How 
then, do we explain that all the great apes do have the ability to form secondary representations? 
It could be that they each evolved this trait independently. That would require that on each of the 
branches (see Figure 1) there must have been a time at which each species evolved this 
capacity. So we would have to make at least four assumptions about change – four times there 
would have been a separate event in which the capacity evolved (or five if bonobos and 
chimpanzees also evolved it independently from each other). The alternative hypothesis is that all 
of today’s great ape species have this trait because of common descent. We would have to 
propose that our common ancestor some 14 million years ago already had this capacity. Because 
this homology hypothesis requires only one change, emergence of the ability before 14 million 
years, this is a far more parsimonious proposal than the alternative.14  
Phylogenetic reconstruction thus suggests that the great ape common ancestor had the capacity 
for secondary representation.15 This is therefore a quite powerful method of inference. We are 
making a statement about the mind of a creature that lived 14 million years ago without ever 
having to lay eyes on a fossil of that species. We are currently investigating if secondary 
representation is older still by studying the capacities of lesser apes (ie, gibbons and siamangs). 
Phylogenetic reconstruction is an underused method that can significantly expand our knowledge 
about the minds of our ancestors.  
Route 3: Analogy 
There is a temptation to animate our extinct ancestors more generally through analogies with 
living primates. For example, it is often proposed that we evolved from a ’chimpanzee-like’ 
ancestor. Wrangham (2001) even goes so far as to suggest that we should call Australopithecene 
hominids who lived between 4 and 2 million years ago Pan Prior (ie, the earlier chimpanzee).16 
However, such analogies can be misleading. One may, for example, find oneself arguing over 
which one of two equally distant extant species would be the better model. In our case, some 
scholars debate whether our common ancestor was more like the chimpanzee or the bonobo. 
Was it a hunting species like the chimpanzee where males dominate, or was it more of a 
peacenik like the bonobo, living in an egalitarian society and engaging in an extraordinary amount 
of sex? Bonobos and chimpanzees are quite different and they are equally far removed from the 
human lineages, as they branched off from each other approximately 2.5 million years ago (see 
Figure 1). Rather than argue about which of the two is the better model, I think that the difference 
between these species of Pan should remind us that they too have evolved since the time of the 
common ancestor. We are not descended from chimpanzees or bonobos. These apes would 
have an equal right to claim that they have evolved from humans (or Homo prior). They too have 
had over 5 million years of evolution since the last common ancestor.  
We need to realise that phylogenetic reconstruction only works for an individual trait, not for the 
entire phenotype. One can say something about a shared trait (eg, the thickness of tooth enamel) 
that a common ancestor is likely to have had. However, that does not mean that other non-shared 
characteristics can be extrapolated back into the past. The common ancestor of chimpanzees, 
bonobos and humans may have had characteristics not present in any of the living descendents, 
and others that are present in one or another of its descendents. Analogies to living species can 
be inspirational and can lead to novel hypotheses. But other sources of information are required 
to substantiate such ideas. For instance, analogies may be related to the archeological record via 
investigation of how the extant living system would transform into a fossil record.17 Without such 
substantiation, the use of analogy may be very misleading and should be treated with appropriate 
suspicion. 
Route 4: Regression models 
How else, then, could the study of living primates inform us about the evolution of the human 
mind? There is a fourth way. We can use models that describe the relationship between variables 
in the present world and apply them to the past. For example, Robin Dunbar identified a 
correlation between neocortex ratio (ie, the ratio between the size of the neocortex and the size of 
the rest of the brain), and group size in primates.18 As the number of average group members 
increases so too does the neocortex ratio. This finding has been used as an argument for the 
social intelligence hypothesis, which claims that the driving forces of the evolution of the intellect 
have not been physical but social challenges. There is good evidence that apes do keep track of 
individuals’ relative positions in their social hierarchy.19 They also know how individuals are 
related to each other. There is even evidence for tactical deception and other forms of social 
problem solving.20 The social structure changes with coalitions that are established and 
maintained through grooming. So the more members there are in a group, the more complex is 
the web of information of which an astute social player has to keep track – and this may require a 
bigger cognitive apparatus to process.   
The social intelligence hypothesis is only one of several competing proposals.21 However, one 
can use the fact that there is an association between group size and neocortex ratio in living 
primates to make inferences about the past. The archeological record does feature skulls of our 
hominid ancestors from which one can infer neocortex ratio. With this variable available, one can 
use regression to infer the likely group size in which these extinct hominids lived. According to 
Dunbar’s interpolation, over the last 3 million years there has been a steady increase in the 
average group size that hominids lived in from 70 to 150. This method, like phylogenetic 
reconstruction, can therefore produce better than chance predictions about long extinct 
ancestors.  
Dunbar takes the interpolation process one step further.22 Grooming is an important factor in 
maintaining group cohesion. More grooming time is required in larger groups. Primates spend up 
to 20-30 per cent of their time grooming each other. Grooming time can therefore be predicted for 
our ancestral species because, based on their brain sizes, we have an estimate of their group 
sizes. Of course we introduce another error term in the equation, but this method is still more 
likely to be accurate than mere guesswork. Dunbar argues that in line with the previous 
regression the natural human group size is about 150 (citing evidence ranging from average 
hunter-gatherer groups sizes to the average number of people that attend funerals). Extrapolating 
from the regression of grooming time on group size in primates, a group size of 150 would require 
group members to spend about 40 per cent of their waking time grooming. This would seriously 
cut into the time required for gathering food and other essentials. Clearly, humans do not groom 
each other 40 per cent of the time. Dunbar suggests that we talk instead - we gossip.23 This is not 
my theory to defend. But the point is that one can use general models about the relationship 
between variables in primates and use them to reconstruct and make predictions about our past. 
Ideally, one would then seek to reconfirm predictions through the archeological record, using 
converging evidence to create a far more convincing account. 
Bridging the gap 
The study of primates can help us solve the puzzle of the evolution of the human mind. 
Continuing fact-finding should bring into clearer view what is unique about our mind. 
Characteristics of the mind of our common ancestor with chimpanzees and the other great apes 
can be inferred through phylogenetic reconstruction. The question about how to bridge the 
evolutionary gap then becomes more refined: how did the mind of that ancestor change over 5 
million years into our modern human mind? One of the most common mistakes that people make 
in this context is to presume that our ancestors went straight forward along a single direct 
trajectory, evolving up the stairway to Homo. This was not the case.  
There were a variety of different hominid species. And fossil evidence of new species emerge 
surprisingly regularly.24 For example, consider the important period between 1.6 and 1.8 million 
years ago, a time when some hominids first developed bi-facial hand axes and other stone tools. 
Although there are debates about some classification25 this period seems to feature six species of 
hominids: Homo erectus, Homo habilis, Homo ergaster, Homo rudolfensis, Paranthropus 
robustus, and Paranthorpus boisei. These were all upright walking, big-brained hominids who 
probably at times even shared the same valleys. Paranthropus boisei (a heavy build hominid with 
a wide face) and Homo erectus (the manufacturer of bi-facial hand axes) graced the planet for 
over a million years, whereas modern humans have merely been here a fifth of that time. Since 
there were several branches, the question is why we are the only surviving lineage of this 
multitude of hominid forms. Why did the others die out?   
Radical environmental changes (eg, ice ages) are often responsible for extinctions. However, I 
suggest that, given what we know about our own recorded history, we ourselves are a suspect. It 
is clear that humans can be ferocious in displacing other human groups that are inferior in terms 
of technology.26 Humans have the frightening habit of quickly displacing previous inhabitants, 
whether through genocide, through competition, habitat destruction, or, more indirectly, through 
the introduction of novel germs. The plight of today’s indigenous peoples is a continuation of this 
process. In Australia, we should certainly be aware of the rapid and devastating effects a 
technologically advanced population can have on more ancient cultures.27 Of course, we could do 
better than that; and we should. In the face of current globalisation, we can and should make 
ethical choices that take the threat of more such extinctions into consideration.28 The point, 
however, is that this is a common pattern in human history.  
This tendency must have emerged at some stage. In terms of active destruction, note that 
evidence for warfare goes back to prehistoric hunter-gatherers.29 Chimpanzees are the only other 
primate known to cooperate to directly kill conspecifics. Such aggression may hence have quite 
ancient roots. However, bonobos, as far as we know, do not engage in such killings. Thus, this 
characteristic may have evolved independently in humans and chimpanzees, or it evolved in the 
common ancestor 5 million years ago and bonobos lost it. Evolutionary parsimony cannot decide 
between these options as both require two changes.   
It is clear, however, that humans today, and throughout recorded history have been directly (eg, 
through force or competition) and indirectly (eg, through habitat destruction or germs) responsible 
for the demise of other species and of other human ethnic groups. Thus, we need to consider the 
possibility that the best explanation at present may be that our more ancient forebears similarly 
were involved in the extinctions of closely related hominid species.30 The gap between animal 
and human mind may appear so large, and so baffling, only because we destroyed the missing 
links. By displacing our hominid cousins, we ourselves may have burnt the bridges across the 
gap. And we found ourselves on the other side of the divide, wondering how we got there.  
I am not suggesting that our ancestors deliberately went out to exterminate all other hominid 
species. The various extinctions were probably complex processes involving a multitude of 
different factors. However, I do want to emphasise that it is certainly quite possible, if not likely, 
that our forebears played some role in this. Such a perspective may help demystify the apparent 
gap between animals and humans. It also raises an intriguing question about our present 
situation. If we were involved in creating the gap, are we continuing to increase it? We could 
increase the gap by becoming smarter. If continuing IQ test score increases31  were anything to 
go by, that would seem to be the case. However, there is also the perhaps traditional way of 
widening the gap: we could destroy our closest living relatives, the other great ape species. In 
fact, we are in the process of doing just that. All the great ape species are under threat. 
Continued habitat destruction may mean that in a few decades these relatives of ours may 
become extinct. And with the extinction of the other great apes, our own descendents might 
wonder about how different they are from their closest living animal relatives: the monkeys. I thus 
put forward the hypothesis that the perception that we are very unique and different from other 
animals, is to a large extent our own doing. We came about by natural selection and gradual 
transitions, but intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the extinction of our closest relatives, 
creating the appearance of a gap in the evolutionary record.  
Conclusions 
I discussed four different routes through which we can reconstruct the past by studying living 
primates. We can find facts in order to identify what is unique and what is shared. We can use 
those facts to reason about the mind of our common ancestors using phylogenetic reconstruction. 
We can speculate about analogies, and we can use generalised regression models that work for 
living primates and apply them to our past through interpolation. There appears to be a vast gap 
between animal and human minds, but our closest living relatives are far smarter than many 
people might believe. They have the ability to think about things not currently perceived much like 
a 24-month-old human child. Phylogenetic reconstruction suggests that our common ancestor 
living some 14 million years ago already had this capacity. Some of our mental characteristics, 
like the ability to meta-represent, appear not to be shared and hence must have evolved after the 
time our line split from that which led to chimpanzees some 5 million years ago. I argued that the 
difference between the human and animal mind may appear so vast because our ancestors 
displaced our hominid relatives. Our mysteriously unique status on Earth may be our own, rather 
than God’s, creation.  
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